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ABSTRACT
Contrary to the common belief that mobility makes security
more diﬃcult to achieve, we show that node mobility can,
in fact, be useful to provide security in ad hoc networks.
We propose a technique in which security associations be-
tween nodes are established, when they are in the vicinity of
each other, by exchanging appropriate cryptographic mate-
rial. We show that this technique is generic, by explaining
its application to fully self-organized ad hoc networks and
to ad hoc networks placed under an (oﬀ-line) authority. We
also propose an extension of this basic mechanism, in which
a security association can be established with the help of
a “friend”. We show that our mechanism can work in any
network conﬁguration and that the time necessary to set
up the security associations is strongly inﬂuenced by sev-
eral factors, including the size of the deployment area, the
mobility patterns, and the number of friends; we provide a
detailed investigation of this inﬂuence.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer -
Communication Networks—General
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security and mobility seem to be at odds with each other.
Security is usually enforced by a static, central authority
that is generally in charge of securing the system under
consideration, be it a communication network, an operat-
ing system, or the access system to the vault of a bank. In
this case, because users are static as well, their locations are
predictable, they are more likely to be available, and the
system can more easily perform appropriate controls.
In this paper, we will show that this intuition can be mis-
leading: mobility, far from being a hurdle, can be useful
to establish security associations1 between any two mobile
nodes of a given network.
The idea underpinning the solution that we propose is
extremely straightforward, as it simply mimics human be-
havior: if people want to communicate securely, they just
get close to each other in order to exchange information and
to establish (or reinforce) mutual credentials.
In spite of its simplicity, this idea is very powerful, as it
can be applied to virtually any mobile ad hoc network at
any layer (from the MAC up to the application layer). It
makes it possible to provide security either without any kind
of central authority, or with an authority the role of which
is limited to the initial delivery of certiﬁcates.
In the ﬁrst case, we will consider fully self-organized secu-
rity: in such a setting, there is no central authority whatso-
ever, and the establishment (and releasing) of security asso-
ciations is purely based on mutual agreement between users.
In this case, we will assume the presence of a secure side
channel (e.g., physical contact between nodes or infrared
communication) which can be established at will by two
users close to each other. We will show that our solution
is extremely intuitive for the users, as it faithfully matches
human relationships and encounters.
The second case corresponds to situations where an au-
thority provides the authorization to each mobile node to
join the network, but it does so only at the initialization
of each node (the authority is considered to be oﬀ-line);
moreover, we allow the nodes to join the network at dif-
ferent times (in general, the authority does not even know
how many nodes are eventually going to be present in the
1The precise deﬁnition of security association will be pro-
vided in Section 3, as it depends on the considered scenario.
network). An important usage of this approach is to se-
cure routing. Usually, the security of routing in mobile ad
hoc networks requires a rather heavy initialization phase,
which can even include the pre-loading in nodes of secret
keys shared with other nodes [16, 15, 23]. This is well suited
for “closed” networks, but not for the case we consider here;
in particular, it would prohibit the entry of new nodes once
the network is already in operation.
As we will see, the proposed system is “democratic”, in
the sense that each node is assigned exactly the same role,
in contrast to some other proposals [27]. Moreover, our so-
lution avoids the weakness of having a single point of fail-
ure (except the oﬀ-line certiﬁcation authority, in the case in
which there is one).
To the best of our knowledge, the only research published
so far on this topic [2] presents the idea that mobility can be
used to set up security associations. Here, we signiﬁcantly
develop this concept by quantifying the beneﬁts of mobil-
ity and by introducing a new mechanism (“friends”) that
supports the building of security associations, even between
nodes that do not meet physically.
The work presented in this paper is a part of the Termin-
odes Project [14].
The organization of the paper is the following. In Sec-
tion 2, we survey the related work. In Section 3, we provide
the model of our system and describe how security associ-
ations are created based on encounters. In Section 4, we
study the pace at which the security associations are cre-
ated. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. STATE OF THE ART
Several solutions have already been proposed to set up
security associations between nodes in an ad hoc network.
In [27], Zhou and Haas propose a distributed public-key
management service for ad hoc networks. The service, as a
whole, has a public/private key pair K/k, which is used to
verify/sign public-key certiﬁcates of the network nodes. It is
assumed that all nodes in the system know the public key K
and trust any certiﬁcate signed with the private key k. The
private key k is not known to any of the nodes. Instead, it is
divided into n shares using a (n, t+1) threshold cryptography
scheme, and the shares are assigned to n arbitrarily chosen
nodes, called servers. For the service to sign a certiﬁcate,
each server generates a partial signature for the certiﬁcate
using its private key share and submits the partial signature
to a combiner that computes the signature from the partial
signatures. The application of threshold cryptography en-
sures that the system can tolerate a certain number t < n of
compromised servers in the sense that at least t + 1 partial
signatures are needed to compute a correct signature. Be-
sides threshold signatures, the proposed key management
service also employs proactive share refreshing in order to
tolerate mobile adversaries and to adapt its conﬁguration
to changes in the network. Unfortunately, the proposal has
two major drawbacks: First, it requires an authority to em-
power the servers. Second, it assumes that some of the nodes
must behave as servers, which does not seem to be realistic,
at least in civilian applications.
A more recent proposal by Kong et al. [17] describes a sim-
ilar approach, but it provides a more fair distribution of the
burden by allowing any node to carry a share of the private
key of the service. The advantage is increased availability,
because now any t + 1 node in the local neighborhood of
the requesting node can issue or renew a certiﬁcate. An-
other interesting novelty is that any node not yet possessing
a share can obtain a share from any group of at least t + 1
nodes that already possess a share. It is therefore suﬃcient
to initialize only t + 1 nodes with appropriate shares when
the system is initialized. But, as in [27], the ﬁrst t+1 nodes
must be initialized by a trusted authority. In addition to
this drawback, there are two problems with this proposal:
First, the number t must be a trade-oﬀ between availabil-
ity and robustness; but it is unclear how the value of t can
be changed in case the overall number of nodes signiﬁcantly
increases (or decreases). Second, the system seems to be
vulnerable to the Sybil attack [9]: an attacker can take as
many identities as necessary to collect enough shares and
reconstruct the system’s private key.
A diﬀerent approach by Asokan and Ginzboorg in [1] is
based on a shared password. As mentioned by the authors,
nodes willing to establish a secure session must share a prior
context. In the considered scenario, a small group of people
get together in a room for an ad hoc meeting and want to set
up a wireless network session among their laptop computers
for the duration of the meeting. It is assumed that they do
not have access to public-key infrastructure or third-party
key management services. The proposed solution is the fol-
lowing: A fresh password is chosen and shared among those
present in the room (e.g., by writing it on a blackboard).
However, it would be a mistake to use this password directly
as the shared key, as the protocol would then be vulnerable
to dictionary attacks [20]. Therefore, the authors propose to
make use of password-authenticated key exchange by which
the parties derive a strong shared key starting from only a
weak secret (i.e., the password). This proposal only works if
the parties can share a password by being physically present
in the same room. Moreover, it has the drawback of being
somewhat cumbersome, as it requires the users to type the
password in their personal device. Finally, the system can
easily be penetrated by an adversary who could obtain ac-
cess to the password by means of a microphone or a camera.
Another approach, originally designed for the address own-
ership problem in Mobile IPv6, is described by Montenegro
and Castelluccia in [21] and by O’Shea and Roe in [22].
Their idea is to derive the IP address of the node from its
public key: ﬁrst, the public key is hashed with a crypto-
graphic hash function, and then, (part of) the hash value is
used as part of the IP address of the node. The advantage
is that there is no longer need for certiﬁcates that bind the
node’s address to its public key, since one is derived from
the other in a cryptographically veriﬁable way. In our pro-
posal, we adopted this approach to bind node addresses to
public keys, and we also considered the problem of binding
user identiﬁers to public keys.
In [8], we propose a self-organized public-key management
system for ad hoc networks, which is similar to PGP in the
sense that users issue certiﬁcates for each other based on
their personal acquaintances. In that system, each user
maintains a local certiﬁcate repository. When two users
want to verify the public keys of each other, they merge
their local certiﬁcate repositories and try to ﬁnd (within the
merged repository) appropriate certiﬁcate chains that make
the veriﬁcation possible. We propose several construction al-
gorithms and show that even simple algorithms can achieve
high performances in the sense that any user can ﬁnd at
least one certiﬁcate chain to any other user in their merged
repository with a high probability, even if the size of their
local repositories is kept small. There are, however, two
disadvantages: First, each user is required to build her lo-
cal certiﬁcate repository before she can use the system; this
leads to some overhead, both in terms of time and band-
width. Second, as any approach that uses certiﬁcate chains,
this approach also assumes that trust is transitive. In order
to alleviate the latter problem, we rely on local detection of
inconsistent certiﬁcates and the use of authentication met-
rics.
As we mentioned earlier, an approach conceptually very
close to our proposal is described in [2]. In that work, Bal-
fanz et al. assume (as we do in this paper) that the users
can make use of privileged side channels, they call location-
limited channels, for the establishment of security associ-
ations when they are in the vicinity of each other. The
location limited channels are assumed to be secure against
active attacks. However, the authors do not explain in the
paper how the mobility of the nodes can be used to progres-
sively reinforce the security of the nodes. Furthermore, it
does not contain a mechanism based on a common trusted
friend.
Finally, we must mention the work of Grossglauser and
Tse in [11], and Grossglauser and Vetterli in [12], the ﬁrst pa-
pers, to our knowledge, claiming that mobility can be useful
in solving certain problems of ad hoc networks. In [11], the
authors study a model of an ad hoc network where nodes are
assumed to be mobile and communicate in random source-
destination pairs. They examine the per-session through-
put for applications with loose delay constraints, such that
the topology changes over the time-scale of packet deliv-
ery. They show that under this assumption, the per-user
throughput can increase dramatically when nodes are mo-
bile rather than static. In [12], the authors show that node
mobility can be used to disseminate destination location in-
formation in ad hoc networks without incurring any commu-
nication overhead. They achieve this by letting each node
maintain a local database of the time and location of its last
encounter with other nodes in the network. This database
is consulted by packets to obtain estimates of their desti-
nation’s current location. As a packet travels towards its
destination, it is able to successively reﬁne an estimate of
the destination’s precise location, because node mobility has
“diﬀused” estimates of that location. A more recent work by
Dubois-Ferriere, Grossglauser and Vetterli [10] shows that if
nodes keep track of their encounters, route discovery can
be performed at a much lower cost than with traditional
broadcast search methods.
A more detailed overview of the security issues in wireless
ad hoc networks can be found in [6].
More work in the area of ad hoc network security has
been reported in [26, 25, 18, 4, 24, 13, 3, 5]; these papers
are loosely related to the security problems observed in this
paper.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Assumptions and overview
We consider and discuss two models: the ﬁrst is fully self-
organized, and the second assumes the presence of a trusted
authority.
3.1.1 Fully self-organized ad hoc networks
We consider an ad hoc network of mobile nodes, where
each node represents a user equipped with a personal mobile
device. We assume that each legitimate user has a single
device.
We consider the network to be fully self-organized, mean-
ing that there is no infrastructure (hence no PKI), no cen-
tral authority, no centralized trusted third party, no central
server, and no secret share dealer even in the initialization
phase. As already mentioned, a fundamental assumption is
that each node is its own authority domain. To make the
problem tractable, we therefore assume that each node is
able to generate cryptographic keys, to check signatures and,
more generally, to accomplish any task required to secure its
communications (including to agree on cryptographic pro-
tocols with other nodes).
If a user i can relate the name (or the face) of another user
j to his (j’s) public key, we will say that there is a one-way
security association from i to j. Two one-way security asso-
ciations between i and j (one in each direction) constitute
a two-way security association between i and j; in the rest
of the paper, security associations will be considered to be
two-way if not mentioned otherwise.
When they meet, users are naturally given the possibility
to visually identify each other. The decision to set up a secu-
rity association between two nodes is based on this physical
encounter. To support this mechanism, we assume that each
device is equipped with a short range connectivity system
(e.g., infrared or wire). We call a channel established by this
mechanism a secure side channel. A secure side channel can
only be point to point and works only when the nodes are
within a “secure range” of each other. We consider this
assumption to be realistic, as virtually all personal mobile
devices are equipped with infrared interfaces.
The secure side channel is used to set up security associa-
tions between nodes by exchanging cryptographic material.
We assume that the activation of the side channel is made
by both users consciously and simultaneously. The users
are given the opportunity to associate a “human face” to
the established security association. This operation is very
similar to the exchange of business cards; in fact, it can even
be transparently combined with the exchange of electronic
business cards (e.g., exchange of vCards2 between PDAs).
If a user wants to establish a security association with a
user-independent device (e.g., a printer), she will identify
the device visually and bind its identity to the context in
which the device operates. In this paper, however, we focus
on the establishment of security associations between users’
personal communication devices.
We assume that an adversary can eavesdrop on all ra-
dio links and can manipulate messages in all kinds of ways.
However, the adversary cannot modify messages transmit-
ted over the secure side channel. Note that we do not require
the secure side channel to protect the conﬁdentiality of ex-
changed information. Finally, we consider that an adversary
can have at its disposal as many fake devices as it wants.
Our proposal is based on public-key cryptography for two
main reasons. First, the distribution of public keys does not
require conﬁdential channels. In our case, this means that
the secure side channel does not need to provide protection
against eavesdropping, and therefore its implementation can
2http://www.imc.org/pdi/
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Figure 1: Three mechanisms to create new security
associations using (a) the secure side channel, (b) a
common friend, and (c) the combination of the ﬁrst
two approaches.
be based on various technologies that would not be suitable
otherwise for the exchange of symmetric keys. Second, as we
will see, we allow the nodes to establish security associations
with the help of friends. Friends can distribute public-keys
(e.g., in form of certiﬁcates) without being able to decrypt
messages that are encrypted with those public keys and to
forge signatures that can successfully be veriﬁed with those
public keys. On the other hand, if two nodes exchanged a
symmetric key via a common friend, then the friend would
be able to use that symmetric key for encrypting and de-
crypting subsequent messages of the two nodes; we consider
this to be undesirable; our system does not allow it.
In order to support diﬀerent applications, we allow each
node to have several public key / private key pairs, that
are all generated by the node itself. However, in order to
make the presentation easier in the rest of the paper, we will
assume that each node has a single public key / private key
pair. Our proposal works without this assumption too, and
we will brieﬂy point out at the appropriate places how it can
incorporate multiple key pairs per node.
Each node must have a node address that is used by the
routing protocol. We assume that the node address is gen-
erated from the public key of the node3 by making use of
a technique similar to CAM [22] or SUCV [21]. In this
way, node addresses become veriﬁable. Note that a mali-
cious node may generate several node addresses for itself
and freely distribute them to other nodes. Whether this is
a problem very much depends on how the routing protocol
is secured. A thorough study of this issue is left for future
work.
We assume that the user identiﬁcation is human-friendly;
typically, a user is identiﬁed by his or her (ﬁrst name, last
name) pair. This is often considered to be insuﬃcient, be-
cause of homonyms. However, as we will see later, the
identity of a given user is used exclusively via a common
friend; therefore, the context in which the operation takes
3If the node has several public keys, then the node address
is generated from a designated one.
place will naturally remove any potential ambiguities (for
example, when asked by someone to provide the address or
phone number of a friend, we very rarely face the problem
of homonyms, and we easily cope with it). Peoples’ names
change only exceptionally, meaning that users can rely on
them in the long run.
The basic mechanism for setting up security associations
relies on the physical encounters of users and the activation
of the secure side channel. However, in order to expedite the
process, we assume that nodes can also rely on friends. Two
nodes i and j are said to be friends if (i) they trust each other
to always provide correct information about themselves and
about other nodes they have previously encountered, and (ii)
they have already established a security association between
each other (typically, they know each others’ public keys).
The security association between friends is assumed to be es-
tablished (or at least checked) over an out-of-band channel.
We assume the friend relationship to be non-transitive.
Even if in our approach the nodes establish security asso-
ciations through encounters, we do allow users to establish
security association by other means (e.g., through certiﬁ-
cates issued by a trusted authority or through oﬀ-line chan-
nels). Thus, our scheme can support and enhance existing
security solutions for ad hoc networks (e.g., the creation of
a certiﬁcate graph [8]).
3.1.2 Ad hoc networks with a central authority
Here, we consider an ad hoc network of mobile nodes,
controlled by an (oﬀ-line) central authority. This means
that the authority controls network membership and decides
which nodes can join the network and how.
We assume that each node has a unique identity (e.g.,
assigned to it by the authority). Furthermore, each node
holds a certiﬁcate signed to it by the authority that binds
the node’s identity and its public-key. We further assume
that each node holds a correct public key of the authority,
so that it can verify the correctness of the certiﬁcates that
other nodes hold. Here, like in the self-organized approach,
each node is able to generate cryptographic keys, to check
signatures, and more generally to accomplish any task re-
quired to secure its communications (including to agree on
cryptographic protocols with other nodes).
If a node i possesses a certiﬁcate signed by the central
authority that binds node j with its (j’s) public key, then
we say that there exists a one-way security association from i
to j. Here again, two one-way security associations between
nodes i and j (one in each direction) constitute a two-way
security association between the nodes.
When two nodes move into power range of each other,
they will exchange certiﬁcates that contain their public keys
and establish a security association. This direct establish-
ment of security associations breaks the routing-security in-
terdependence cycle [16]: Security associations cannot be
established over multiple hops as the routing protocol does
not operate securely (because security associations are not
established yet). This means that if two users want to
establish security associations, their packets could be sent
through false routes, or simply dropped. Some solutions
to the routing-security interdependence problem were pro-
posed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson [16]. Their ﬁrst proposed
solution consists in pre-loading pairwise keys in all nodes to
create all the security associations at the initialization. How-
ever, this approach prevents the insertion of new nodes in
the network. The second approach makes use of an on-line
key distribution center. Although eﬀective, this approach
requires a costly initialization phase and the use of complex
security protocols. Our mobility-based approach is diﬀerent
in the sense that it enables a ﬂexible setup of security as-
sociations, simpliﬁes the introduction of new nodes in the
network, and requires only an oﬀ-line authority; the draw-
back is that the establishment of the security associations
requires some time, as detailed in Section 4.
Here, again, like in the self-organized approach, we allow
the use of the friends mechanism to facilitate the establish-
ment of the security associations. We note, however, that
in some lower layer applications (e.g., routing), the friends
mechanism will not have practical value.
The major diﬀerence between the fully self-organized and
the authority-based approach stands in user involvement: In
a fully self-organized approach, users need to establish se-
curity associations consciously, while in the authority-based
approach, users do not need to be aware of the establishment
of the security associations, as it is done automatically. The
use of either of these approaches will strongly depend on the
purpose of the network. Typically, the self-organized ap-
proach will be useful in securing personal communications
on the application level, whereas the authority-based ap-
proach will be used to secure networking mechanisms such
as routing.
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we describe the op-
eration of our scheme with the fully self-organized approach;
we note, however, that the presented analysis equally applies
to the authority-based approach.
3.2 Mechanisms to establish security
associations
A (two-way) security association between two nodes i and
j is represented by the triplet (ui, ki, ai) at the side of j
and the triplet (uj , kj , aj) at the side of i, where ui and uj
are the names of the users that are associated with nodes i
and j; ki and kj are the public keys of nodes i and j; and
ai and aj are the node addresses of i and j, respectively
4.
Given a security association between nodes i and j, they can
verify that the node addresses match the public keys, and
they can set up a secure communication channel between
themselves, which protects the integrity and conﬁdentiality
of the exchanged messages. In fact, for eﬃciency reasons,
i and j may want to use symmetric key cryptography for
the protection of their messages; in this case, the symmetric
keys are established using the public keys in the security
association.
If only one of the nodes, say i, has the triplet (uj , kj , aj),
then there is a one-way security association between nodes i
and j. In this case, i can check the node address of j, verify
messages signed by j, and send encrypted messages to j
that j can decrypt, but j cannot check the node address of
i, verify messages signed by i, nor send encrypted messages
to i that i can decrypt. Even so, there are applications
in which one-way security associations may be used. Note
that two one-way security associations between two nodes
(one association in each direction) constitute a (two-way)
security association; therefore, security associations can be
established in two steps by setting up a one-way security
association in each step.
4If the nodes have several public keys, then instead of a
single public key, the triplets contain a set of public keys.
There are three mechanisms that support the establish-
ment of new security associations; they are illustrated in
Figure 1. The ﬁrst is when two nodes i and j are in the
vicinity of each other: they can exchange their triplets us-
ing the secure side channel. Since the secure side channel
ensures the integrity of the exchanged messages, it precludes
the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack, and therefore,
it ensures the secure binding of the received name, public
key, and address. In addition, the users can easily verify
the validity of the received names because the names should
correspond to the people present at the encounters. Each
node can also verify that the other node indeed possesses
the private key that belongs to the received public key by
executing a simple challenge-response protocol. Finally, the
node addresses can be veriﬁed with the public keys.
With the second mechanism, two nodes i and j can ex-
change their triplets if they have a common friend f . A
simple solution is the following: Since f knows the triplets
of both i and j, it can issue (on request from i and/or j)
fresh certiﬁcates for both triplets and send them to j and i,
respectively, via the network. Both i and j know the public
key of f and they also trust f , therefore they can both ver-
ify the received certiﬁcates and will accept the information
therein if the veriﬁcation is successful.
The third mechanism establishes only a one-way security
association between two users i and j, and is based on a
combination of the friendship relationships and the encoun-
ters. If nodes i and f are friends and f has obtained the
triplet of j in an encounter with j, then f can issue (on
request from i) a fresh certiﬁcate for the triplet of j, and
send this certiﬁcate to i via the network. Since i knows the
public key of f and also trusts f , she can verify the received
certiﬁcate and accept the received triplet if the veriﬁcation
is successful.
The second and the third mechanisms show the usefulness
of the friends mechanism for the establishment of security
associations. Note that due to the friends mechanism, a new
node that joins the network will be able to communicate
almost instantaneously with all the nodes with which its
friends already established security associations.
The proposed mechanisms avoid trust transitivity (it is
allowed only in the “ﬁrst hop” through a direct friend).
As shown on Figure 1, friend assisted establishment can be
performed only if a friend has a directly established secu-
rity associations with a target node. This restriction pre-
vents nodes from establishing security associations through
a friend’s friend, or through a friend of a friend of a friend,
etc.
There are many ways to implement these mechanisms;
here we propose two protocols as examples for possible im-
plementations. The ﬁrst mechanism described above can be
built on Protocol 1; Protocol 2 can be used to implement
the second and third mechanism.
Protocol 1: Direct Establishment of a Security
Association
msg1 i → j : ri | ui | ki | ai
msg2 j → i : rj | uj | kj | aj
i : uj?; match(kj , aj)?
j : ui?; match(ki, ai)?
msg3 i → j : σi(rj | ui | uj)
msg4 j → i : σj(ri | uj | ui)
Protocol 1 is executed entirely through the secure side
channel. First, i and j exchange their triplets along with two
freshly generated random numbers ri and rj . Then, i and
j verify locally that the received names uj and ui, respec-
tively, correspond to the person they are facing, and that
the received addresses aj and ai match the received public
keys kj and ki, respectively. If the veriﬁcations are success-
ful, then i and j exchange their signatures σi(rj | ui | uj)
and σj(ri | uj | ui) on the received random number and the
received names. If i and j can successfully verify the signa-
tures with the received public keys, then both can be sure
that the other node knows the corresponding private key.
Depending on the implementation of the secure side chan-
nel, it may be impractical to execute the entire protocol
through the secure side channel. For example, if the users
use an infrared link as the side channel, it might be prob-
lematic for the users to point at each others’ devices during
all time necessary for protocol execution. Therefore, we pro-
pose a variant of Protocol 1 where only two short messages
are exchanged through the secure side channel, and the rest
of the messages are sent using the radio interface of the de-
vices:
Protocol 1’: Direct Establishment of a
Security Association (variant)
msg1 (ssch.) i → j : ai | ξi = h(ri | ui | ki | ai)
msg2 (ssch.) j → i : aj | ξj = h(rj | uj | kj | aj)
msg3 (radio ch.) i → j : ri | ui | ki | ai
msg4 (radio ch.) j → i : rj | uj | kj | aj
i : h(rj | uj | kj | aj) = ξj?; uj?; match(kj , aj)?
j : h(ri | ui | ki | ai) = ξi?; ui?; match(ki, ai)?
msg5 (radio ch.) i → j : σi(rj | ui | uj)
msg6 (radio ch.) j → i : σj(ri | uj | ui)
In Protocol 1’, i and j ﬁrst exchange, through the se-
cure side channel (ssch.), their addresses ai and aj and
the cryptographic hash values ξi = h(ri | ui | ki | ai) and
ξj = h(rj | uj | kj | aj) of their random numbers and triplets.
After this initial exchange, i and j can send messages to each
other through the radio interface since they have exchanged
their addresses. The remaining messages are the same as
the messages of Protocol 1. However, after the exchange of
message 3 and 4, i and j also verify if the hash value of the
received random number and triplet is equal to the received
hash values ξj and ξi, respectively. If so, then they can be
sure that they have received the random number and the
triplet from the party with which they exchanged the ﬁrst
messages through the secure side channel.
Protocol 2: Friend-Assisted Establishment of
a Security Association
msg1 i → f : req : uj | ri
msg2 f → i : uj | kj | aj | σf (ri | uj | kj | aj)
In Protocol 2, i requests the triplet of j from a friend f by
sending the name uj and a freshly generated random num-
ber ri to f . User f responds with a message that contains
the requested triplet and a signature σf (ri | uj | kj | aj)
on the received random number and the triplet itself. If
the signature veriﬁes correctly, then i accepts the triplet.
Using Protocol 2 to establish a one-way security associa-
tion between i and j (third mechanism described above) is
straightforward. To set up a (two-way) security association,
Protocol 2 should be executed by i and f and by j and f
too.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an estimate of the pace at
which security associations are created. We assume that
initially each node establishes security associations only with
its friends; we further assume that each node has the same
number of friends.
4.1 Terminology
Let the population of nodes be represented by the set N ,
with cardinality |N | = n. We will designate by matrix F
the friend relationships between nodes at the beginning of
the operation of the network; the matrix P designates the
desired status of security associations; and the matrix E(t)
designates the status of security associations at time t. All
three matrices are of size n × n. For the sake of generality,
we assume F to be non-symmetric. Note that none of the
matrices is stored as such; In reality, each node contains a
row of each of them.
More speciﬁcally, matrix F = [fij ] is deﬁned as follows:
fij =
{
1 if i trusts j (i.e., j is a friend of i)
0 otherwise
Matrix P = [pij ] captures the fact that in the general
case, a given user is interested in communicating with only
a subset of the other users:
pij =


1 if i wants to know the public key
and node address of node j
0 otherwise
Finally, E(t) = [eij(t)] represents the evolution of the se-
curity associations over time:
eij(t) =


1 if, at time t, i knows the public key
and node address of node j
0 otherwise
At the beginning, we will have E(t0) = F . Over time, the
number of “1”s in E(t) will increase, until they represent
a “superset” of the “1”s contained in P , at which stage we
will consider that the system has achieved the required level
of security. In other words, if we represent this time by
tω, we will have that pij = 1 implies eij(tω) = 1 for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ |N |.
Regardless of the kind of the cryptosystem used, we should
note that it is possible to use friendships even before the
nodes start moving: if fik = 1 and fkj = 1, then eij(t0) and
eji(t0) can be set to 1.
The speed of the creation of security associations depends
on the likelihood that the nodes will be in the vicinity of
each other. For this reason, the time needed for the nodes to
establish security associations of interest is strongly related
to the kind of mobility patterns that the nodes follow and the
number of the security associations they want to establish.
Therefore, we study the evolution of the matrix E(t) under
two diﬀerent mobility models: random walk and (restricted)
random waypoint.
In our analysis, we will observe two values: the conver-
gence r(t), which represents the fraction of the required se-
curity associations established until time t, and the conver-
gence time tω, which is the time needed to establish all the
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Figure 2: Convergence r1×s(t) with the random walk
model for various sizes (number of vertices |V |) of
the rectangle grid and with diﬀerent numbers of de-
sired security associations s.
desired security associations. r(t) is thus computed as
r(t) =
∑n
i,j eij(t) · pij∑n
i,j pij
and the convergence time tω is the earliest time at which
r(tω) = 1.
We consider two scenarios: (i) a single node wants to es-
tablish s security associations and (ii) all n nodes want to
establish security associations with s nodes each. We denote
the convergence and the convergence time in the ﬁrst case
by r1×s(t) and t1×sω , and in the second case by r
n×s(t) and
tn×sω , respectively.
4.2 Random walk mobility
Although in reality, node positions are continuous pro-
cesses in continuous time, here we use a discrete approxi-
mation and we assume two types of topologies: a rectan-
gular grid and a torus-like grid. A rectangular grid of size
m2 is a two-dimensional square grid of m×m vertices with
boundaries. A torus-like grid of size m2 is a two-dimensional
square grid of m×m vertices with continuous boundary con-
ditions, meaning that its boundary vertices are connected to
the boundary vertices on the opposite side of the area. By
G(V,E), we denote the graph representing the grid (in both
cases), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges,
respectively. We denote the number of the mobile nodes on
the graph by n and the node density by λ = n/|V |.
The movement of the nodes on these two topologies dif-
fers. On a rectangular grid, the nodes that reach bound-
ary vertices of a simulation area bounce back into the area,
whereas on a torus-like grid, the nodes that reach one side
of the simulation area continue travelling and reappear on
the opposite side of the area.
We assume that the nodes perform a random walk on
G. More precisely, the position Xi(t) of a mobile node i
at discrete time t is an independent random process with
a stationary distribution π. This means that a node (ini-
tially located at a vertex v0) moves at each step with an
equal likelihood (1/5) to one of the neighboring vertices, or
stays at its current position with the same probability (1/5).
The secure side channel between two nodes can be activated
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when they are located on the same vertex.
We simulated the behavior of random walks for three dif-
ferent sizes of the rectangle grid and with two diﬀerent num-
bers of security associations s. The results of the simulations
are shown in Figure 2. The simulations were performed 20
times for each conﬁguration and the averaged results are
presented with a conﬁdence interval of 95%.
These results show that for a small |V |, t1×sω ≈ |V | and
t1×sω = O(|V | log |V |) in general5. These results can be in-
terpreted in the following way: If a node moves according
to the random walk within a given area, but in such a way
that its movement is restricted to a set of meeting points
connected into a grid-like structure, then the expected time
at which it meets all of its desired communication partners
is in the order of |V | log |V |, where |V | is the number of
meeting points (i.e., the size of the graph).
We further observe that the convergence depends essen-
tially on the size of the grid and not signiﬁcantly on s. This
means that, for a given grid size, an approximately equal
fraction of the desired security associations will be estab-
lished after some time t, regardless of the number of the
desired security associations. This is not surprising as the
nodes are uniformly distributed over the grid. Thus, the
higher the density, the higher the number of security asso-
ciations that a node will establish in each step. It is also
worth noticing that the convergence increases very fast at
the beginning, and that 90% of the desired security associ-
ations are established in approximately half of the conver-
gence time (note that time is represented in log scale on the
ﬁgures). This happens because in the ﬁrst steps, a node is
likely to interact with other nodes that were initially close
and will, much later, meet the nodes that were initially very
distant.
Here, we extend our analysis to the convergence rn×s(t)
and convergence time tn×sω of all n nodes. These values are
signiﬁcant as they show the time at which the system as
a whole achieves the desired security properties, or more
precisely, the time at which all the nodes have established
the desired security associations. We simulated the time at
5This observation is a result of our more detailed investiga-
tion that we will publish in the future.
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which all n nodes establish security associations with all the
other nodes, meaning that in matrix P , pij = 0 for i = j
and 1 otherwise. The results are shown on Figure 3. Sim-
ulations were run 20 times for each conﬁguration and the
averaged results are presented with a 95% conﬁdence in-
terval6. This ﬁgure shows that as in the single-node case,
90% of the security associations were established in approxi-
mately half of the convergence time. The ﬁgure also shows a
linear (in the number of friends) decrease of the convergence
time, when the friend mechanism is used. This happens for
the following reason: When we extend our scheme with the
friend mechanism, not only the node, but also its friends will
establish security associations with the communication part-
ners of interest. Clearly, each friend has the same chance as
the node itself of meeting the node’s desired communication
partners, provided that the positions of the friends are ini-
tially drawn from a uniform distribution or provided that
the system reached stationarity. Therefore, as conﬁrmed by
simulations, the friend mechanism should reduce the aver-
age convergence time according to the number of the friends,
meaning that tω,f ≈ tω/(f + 1), where tω,f is the average
convergence time with the friends mechanism and f is the
number of friends of each node.
4.3 (Restricted) random waypoint mobility
Having reached a ﬁrst set of results based on the random
walk, we now make use of a more realistic mobility model:
random waypoint mobility model [7], which is the most com-
monly used mobility model for mobile ad hoc networks.
In the random waypoint mobility model, a mobile node
moves on a ﬁnite continuous plane from its current position
to a new location by randomly choosing its destination co-
ordinates, its speed of movement, and the amount of time
that it will pause when it reaches the destination. After the
pause time, the node chooses a new destination, speed, and
pause time. This is repeated for each node, until the end of
simulation time.
Here, we extend this model by allowing users to move in
the same way as in the random waypoint model, but their
choice of destination points is restricted with some proba-
6Note that the conﬁdence intervals are not always visible on
the ﬁgures due to the log scale.
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bility φ to a number of ﬁxed points on a plane. This means
that with probability φ, a node will randomly choose a point
from a ﬁnite set of destination points, and with probability
1 − φ, a node will choose as its destination any point on a
plane. We call this model the restricted random waypoint
mobility model. This model is closer to reality in the sense
that users normally do not randomly choose any point on
a plane as their destination, but rather they move to cer-
tain meeting points (e.g., meeting rooms, lounges, restau-
rants), where communication between the users takes place.
If φ = 1 and if the set of destination points is small, the
convergence time will be very small. On the other hand,
if φ = 0, we have the standard random waypoint mobility
model and the convergence time will be longer.
In this model, two nodes can establish a security associ-
ation if they are in the security range of each other. The
security range is signiﬁcantly smaller than the power range
of the mobile nodes and is the maximum range that is suf-
ﬁcient for the secure side channel to be set up.
Here again, like in the random walk mobility model, we
have observed the creation of the security associations with
two simulation areas: a bounded rectangle simulation area,
where the nodes bounce oﬀ the area borders, and a torus,
where nodes continue to travel through the area bounds and
reappear on the other side of the area. The diﬀerence be-
tween the results in the two cases is marginal and, for the
clarity of the ﬁgures, we show only the results that we ob-
tained for the rectangular area. We note that even if the
random waypoint model is continuous, we simulated it with
a discrete time simulator with a time step equal to 1s.
We observe the convergence rn×s(t) and the convergence
time tn×sω with the restricted waypoint mobility model, for
diﬀerent values of φ, with and without the friend mecha-
nism. The simulation results are shown on Figure 4. The
simulations were run 20 times for each conﬁguration and
the averaged results are presented with 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals.
As we expected, the results show that the convergence
is much faster if the nodes choose “meeting points” as their
destinations with a higher probability than any random des-
tination points on the plane. Here, like in the random walk
scenario, the convergence time remains in the order of the
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N logN , where N is the size of the simulation area. Al-
though the size of the area and time cannot be compared
directly between the two scenarios, this observation is a use-
ful indicator of the speed of creation of the security associ-
ations for a given maximum node speed, which in this case
is 20 m/s. Here again, the friend mechanism speeds up the
convergence and reduces the convergence time by a factor
equal to the number of friends. We further simulated a sce-
nario with n = 100 nodes, but where each node wants to
establish security associations with s = 20 randomly chosen
nodes on a rectangular area. These results are displayed on
Figure 5.
These results show that there is no large diﬀerence in the
convergence between the cases s = 99 and s = 20, but that
the convergence time for the s = 99 case is somewhat longer.
To observe how the convergence and the convergence time
vary with the speed of node movement, we observed the
system behavior for two diﬀerent maximum speeds (5 m/s
and 20 m/s). The results of these simulations are shown
on Figure 6, where simulations were run 20 times for each
scenario and the averaged results are shown with a 95%
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conﬁdence intervals. In compliance with our expectations,
the ﬁgure shows that the convergence is faster as the speed
of the node movement increases. The ﬁgure further shows
that the time to establish 90% of all security associations,
depending on the node speed and the presence of meeting
points, ranges from a couple of hours to a couple of days.
Furthermore, we observed how the convergence changes
with the change of pause time duration and we noticed that
this change is not very signiﬁcant: If the pause time is dou-
bled, the convergence time increases by 10 to 20 percent.
These results are shown on Figure 7.
The speed of establishment of security associations in au-
thority based ad hoc networks will diﬀer from the fully self-
organized scenario because the distance at which nodes will
set up security associations will be signiﬁcantly increased
(typically to their power range). We have simulated this by
setting nodes’ power ranges to 5, 50 and 100 m. The results
are shown on Figure 8. As we expected, the convergence is
much faster with the larger power ranges, and the conver-
gence time is between 5000 to 10000 seconds, without the
friends mechanism.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a solution to the diﬃcult
problem of setting up security associations in mobile ad hoc
networks. We have shown that far from being a drawback,
mobility can in fact help security in such networks. We have
illustrated the genericity of our approach by explaining its
application to two application scenarios: fully self-organized
networks and networks with an oﬀ-line authority.
For the ﬁrst case, we have shown that the mechanism is
highly understandable by the user, as it reproduces the con-
cept of friends and leverages on physical encounters; these
encounters make it possible for a user to associate a face to
a given identity (and to a given public key), solving many
of the problems of classical (hence “remote”) security mech-
anisms (e.g., impersonation attacks and Sybil attacks [9]).
For the second case, we have shown how ad hoc networks
that are secured with a central authority can also bene-
ﬁt from mobility. More speciﬁcally, a direct establishment
of security associations over the (one-hop) radio link solves
the problem known as the security-routing interdependency
loop.
Simulations of our scheme in various mobility scenarios
have demonstrated how the speed of establishment of secu-
rity associations depends on the area size and node speed.
We have observed that in the case of the random walk,
where the node speed is constant, the convergence time is,
in the worst case, in the order of |V | log |V |, where |V | is the
size of the observed area; but with the friend mechanism,
this time can signiﬁcantly be reduced (proportionally to the
number of the friends). The analysis with the restricted ran-
dom waypoint model shows that for certain scenarios (100
nodes, 1 km2, 20 m/s, 20 meeting points, 5 friends, 5 m
security range), the time necessary to establish security as-
sociations between all users is around 10, 000 seconds (less
than 3 hours). However, if the users do not use the friend
mechanism, this time can be as long as 100, 000 seconds
(around 27 hours).
These times may seem long, but we have shown that the
vast majority of the security associations are set up in a
much shorter time. Moreover, if the users are willing to set
up security associations, they can make movement decisions
in order to meet people of interest. This user-assisted ap-
proach requires short-range secure side channels to operate
properly and thus the time to establish security associations
can be as long as a couple of days. However, in ad hoc
networks controlled by an (oﬀ-line) authority, nodes estab-
lish security associations automatically with other nodes in
their power range, and convergence time becomes signiﬁ-
cantly shorter; As our simulations showed, this time is ten
to twenty times shorter than in the fully self-organized sce-
nario, typically from 5000 to 10000 seconds. It is also worth
noticing that more than 70% of security associations are es-
tablished within the ﬁrst 1000 seconds.
Our proposed approach can also be used in other kinds
of networks, notably to build up security associations at
the application layer. For example, the existing Short Mes-
sage Service (SMS) supported by cellular networks could
be secured in a fully self-organized manner: users would
initially declare who their friends are and subsequently ex-
change triplets by means of their infrared interfaces when
they make encounters of interest to them, as described in
section 3. A similar example would be to secure email be-
tween PDAs communicating with each other via wireless
LANs and the Internet.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to
provide a systematic study of the beneﬁts of mobility on
security; we believe that this approach can pave the way
to mobile peer-to-peer security. This paper also shows that
peer-to-peer security is easier to achieve in a mobile setting
than in a static one; indeed, as we have seen, higher mo-
bility leads to a faster creation of the security associations.
An additional strength of our approach is that it is based
exclusively on well-established cryptographic techniques.
In the future, we plan to study more realistic and more so-
phisticated mobility models, including those with correlated
mobility patterns. We also intend to analyze the burden of
the cryptographic functions on the processing units of the
devices and to propose appropriate optimizations (notably
by using symmetric cryptography). We further intend to
investigate rekeying and key revocation schemes.
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